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Credit Constraints and Growth in a Global Economy†
By Nicolas Coeurdacier, Stéphane Guibaud, and Keyu Jin*
We show that in an open-economy OLG model, the interaction 
between growth differentials and household credit constraints—more 
severe in fast-growing countries—can explain three prominent global 
trends: a divergence in private saving rates between advanced and 
emerging economies, large net capital outflows from the latter, and 
a sustained decline in the world interest rate. Micro-level evidence 
on the evolution of age-saving profiles in the US and China corrob-
orates our mechanism. Quantitatively, our model explains about a 
third of the divergence in aggregate saving rates, and a significant 
portion of the variations in age-saving profiles across countries and 
over time. (JEL E21, E22, F21, F32, F41, O16, P24)
Two of the most important developments in the global economy of the recent 
decades are the integration of emerging markets into world capital markets and 
their rapid growth, particularly in certain parts of Asia. Alongside these events are 
three striking and unprecedented macroeconomic trends: (i) a large and persistent 
increase in the private saving rate in emerging Asia against a steady decline in the 
private saving rate in advanced economies; (ii) the emergence of global imbalances, 
with developing countries running a large current account surplus and advanced 
economies a current account deficit; (iii) a sustained fall in the world long-term 
interest rate.
These global patterns challenge standard open-economy growth models. 
 Fast-growing emerging economies should, according to neoclassical theory, borrow 
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against their higher future income to augment consumption and investment—and 
experience a fall in saving rate. At the same time, their fast growth should exert 
upward pressure on the world interest rate. And in the face of high domestic invest-
ment needs, they should become net capital importers rather than net exporters. 
This sharp discrepancy between theory and evidence is forcefully pointed out by 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), who refer to it as the “allocation puzzle.”
In principle, the observed “upstream” capital flows could stem from either low 
investment, or high savings (or both) in emerging markets. The data seems to point 
to differences in savings. An immediate observation is the striking divergence in 
private saving rates between advanced economies and emerging Asia that coincided 
with a period of widening imbalances (Figure 1). Interestingly, the differences in 
the level of saving rates across these regions were rather small at the time of their 
integration around 1990 (panel A). The large divergence in the subsequent 20 years 
culminated into a marked disparity in recent years. The pattern is even more obvious 
for household saving rates, particularly between countries such as the US and China 
(panel B). In the late 1980s, China’s household saving rate was a mere 2–3 percent-
age points higher than that of the US. By 2008, it had reached almost 30 percent 
while the US household saving rate had declined to about 2.5 percent—leading 
to the popular caricature of a “debt-ridden” US put into sharp contrast against a 
“thrifty” Asia.
The experience of the US between 1970–2008 also makes a compelling case: 
while the current account exhibits a strong correlation with household saving over 
this period, there is hardly any relationship with investment (Figure 2, panel A). The 
pattern is echoed in the case of China (panel B). Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) pro-
vide further support to this view, showing that “saving wedges,” rather than “invest-
ment wedges,” are necessary for the standard neoclassical model to replicate the 
observed patterns of international capital flows.
Against this background, the paper offers a theory of saving wedges—focusing 
specifically on heterogeneous household credit constraints across countries and their 
interaction with growth differentials. Our baseline theoretical framework, analyzed 
in Section I, consists of large open economies populated by agents living for three 
periods. This structure provides scope for both international and intergenerational 
borrowing.1 Young borrowers are subject to borrowing constraints, but the severity 
of the constraint differs between advanced and emerging economies. Faster growth 
in emerging economies, where credit constraints are tighter, exerts downward pres-
sure on the world interest rate as greater weight is placed on their (lower) long-run 
autarkic interest rate.2
This fall in the interest rate induces greater borrowing by the young—through 
a loosening of constraints, and greater savings of the middle-aged—through a 
1 Our baseline framework is an extension of Jappelli and Pagano’s (1994) closed-economy, three-period 
OLG model with household credit constraints. Our environment differs from theirs in several dimensions: (i) the 
multi-country, open-economy aspect of our setup; (ii) the asymmetry in household credit constraints across coun-
tries; (iii) more general preferences; (iv) more general income profiles. 
2 What matters for the long-run dynamics of the world interest rate is that emerging economies have a lower 
autarkic steady-state interest rate. If they are capital scarce initially, however, their interest rate can be higher than 
that of advanced economies at the time of opening. 
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 dominant income effect.3 The young’s saving rate falls by more in less constrained 
economies, while the rise in the middle-aged’s saving rate is larger in more con-
strained ones. The asymmetry in the tightness of the constraint across economies 
thus leads to different responses of aggregate saving rates, and a divergence in sav-
ing rates in the long run. The interaction of growth and heterogeneous credit con-
straints is key: without growth differentials, or with symmetric constraints across 
countries, the world interest rate would not permanently decline—critical for the 
saving divergence. Moreover, in the transition, tighter credit constraints in emerging 
countries serve to limit the impact of the positive wealth effect caused by fast pro-
ductivity growth for young consumers.
3 In our baseline model, the income effect dominates if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is smaller than 
one, as usually assumed and in line with most of the empirical evidence (see Campbell 2003). 
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Figure 1. Private and Household Saving Rates
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A natural question arising from our theory is: how did different age groups con-
tribute to the divergence in household savings observed in the data? To address this 
question, we dissect household survey data to provide new micro-evidence on saving 
behavior by age groups (Section II). The two exemplary economies selected, the US 
and China, arguably occupy opposite positions in the spectrum of credit constraint 
tightness, and are also the two most important contributors to global imbalances. 
The empirical challenge is to accurately measure age-saving profiles in the presence 
of potentially large biases inherent to household surveys in both countries—dis-
tinct problems yet equally taxing. The US consumption survey data suffers from 
significant underreporting biases that can, in addition, be time-varying (Slesnick 
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1992). The Chinese household survey suffers from limited data availability at the 
individual level. A common practice to circumvent this problem is to use the age of 
the household head in constructing age-saving profiles. We demonstrate that two 
biases arise in the presence of multi-generational households which is typical in 
China: a selection bias which tends to overestimate the saving rate of the young and 
its change over time, and an aggregation bias which tends to underestimate those of 
the middle-aged (the Deaton and Paxson 2000 critique). We attempt to remove these 
biases to the best of our efforts and estimate age-saving behavior for both economies 
over two decades. The corrected age-saving profiles generally conform better with 
standard life-cycle hypotheses and lend broad support to the qualitative implications 
of our theory.
The following stylized micro facts emerge: (i) the saving rate of young individ-
uals fell significantly in the US over 1988–2008—by about 13 percentage points—
while increasing slightly in China; (ii) the saving rate of the middle-aged rose in 
both countries, but by about 15 percentage points more in China than in the US; (iii) 
there is a marked divergence of saving rates for the retirees—with China’s elderly 
seeing a sharp rise and the US’s seeing a large drop. The elderly, however, contribute 
less to aggregate saving than the other age groups.
Equipped with both macroeconomic and microeconomic facts, we assess in 
Section III the quantitative relevance of the model. An extended, quantitative ver-
sion of the theoretical model is calibrated to the experiences of the US and China 
over the period 1968–2008, incorporating in particular the evolution of demograph-
ics and income profiles in both countries. The model can explain about 30 percent of 
the divergence in aggregate saving rates between the US and China, and a significant 
portion of the evolution in the shape of the age-saving profile in both economies. 
However, it does fall short of explaining the very large increase in household sav-
ings in China, especially for the elderly. The model captures well the dynamics of 
the current account observed in the data, with China experiencing a small current 
account deficit at the time of opening, before building up a large current account 
surplus. Finally, the model predicts a significant drop in the world interest rate.
While the cross-country asymmetry in credit constraints is essential for our 
results, our analysis indicates that the sharp aging of the population in China and 
differences in income profiles across countries, in interacting with credit con-
straints, also contribute to the divergence in saving rates. The data reveals that the 
 age-income profile in China reaches its peak at an earlier age than in the US and 
falls more steeply in old age, especially in the more recent period. This particular 
feature reduces the strength of positive wealth effects on middle age consumption 
implied by faster growth and a falling interest rate—thus contributing to the large 
increase in the saving rate in China generated by the model (see also Guo and Perri 
2012).4 The role of demographics matters insofar as the rapid aging of the Chinese 
population, mostly a result of the one-child policy, implies an increase in the share 
of the middle-aged savers—a composition effect which also amplifies the increase 
in household savings in China.
4 Gourinchas and Rey (2013) also point out the role of the shape of income profiles in generating differences 
in savings and autarky interest rates across countries. Note that wealth effects on middle-aged consumers do not 
operate in the three-period model of Section I since agents receive zero labor income in old age. 
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Combining the macro- and micro-level approaches is a distinctive feature of this 
paper. Past papers on international capital flows between developed and develop-
ing economies have usually taken up the former. Among these, theories relying 
on market imperfections are most closely related to our work (see Gourinchas and 
Rey 2013 for a recent survey). Frictions that impact savings include asset scar-
city in developing countries (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2008), incomplete 
financial markets and uninsurable risk in these economies (Mendoza, Quadrini, and 
 Ríos-Rull 2009),5 lack of firm’s access to liquidity to finance investment in periods 
of rapid growth (Bacchetta and Benhima forthcoming), and international borrowing 
constraints (Benigno and Fornaro 2012). Financial frictions on investment are ana-
lyzed in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011); Buera and Shin (2009); Benhima 
(2013); and Broner and Ventura (2013). Aguiar and Amador (2011) provide a polit-
ical economy perspective with contracting frictions, where fast growing countries 
tend to experience net capital outflows.
There are three distinguishing elements that mark our theory from the aforemen-
tioned. The first is the emphasis on growth in emerging economies as a key driver of 
these aggregate phenomena—as opposed to capital market integration or shocks to 
financial markets in developing countries that are typically analyzed.6 The second 
aspect is the ability of our model to explain the saving rate divergence across countries 
(a time-series effect)—as opposed to mere differences in levels. Third, we emphasize 
household saving divergence as the main driver of global imbalances, in contrast to 
investment-based or corporate-saving-based explanations.7 These explanations, which 
emphasize the role of financial frictions on firms, are complementary to ours.8
Our quantitative findings are also related to previous papers highlighting the role 
of demographics, combined with life-cycle saving behavior, in explaining interna-
tional capital flows. These include empirical studies such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2002), and quantitative analyses focusing on OECD countries such as Domeij and 
Flodén (2006) and Ferrero (2010).
The decline in the household saving rate in the US and its rise in China have, inde-
pendently, garnered a lot of attention. The particular stance we take in this paper is 
that global forces shaped these patterns simultaneously. That is not to say that there 
are no separate, country-specific, reasons why the US saving rate may have declined 
and why China’s saving rate may have risen. As our theory relies on one single 
global mechanism, unsurprisingly, it falls short of explaining the full  divergence of 
5 See also Carroll and Jeanne (2009); Sandri (2010); and Angeletos and Panouzi (2011). 
6 Exceptions are Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Buera and Shin (2009); and Bacchetta and Benhima 
(forthcoming) who also analyze the impact of faster growth in developing countries. 
7 Buera and Shin (2009); Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011); and Benhima (2013) show that financial 
frictions on firms can limit the rise in investment during a phase of growth acceleration, leading to net capital out-
flows from developing countries. Sandri (2010) and Bacchetta and Benhima (forthcoming) emphasize the role of 
corporate savings in the presence of liquidity constraints on firms. 
8 Though important, corporate savings have risen uniformly in developing and advanced economies 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman 2012), and thus may not be able to account for the observed pattern of capital flows. 
Using firm-level data, Bayoumi, Tong, and Wei (2012) show that the corporate saving rate in China is not signifi-
cantly higher than the global average and did not increase faster than the global trend. In 2009, Chinese corporate 
savings amount to 21 percent of GDP, against 25 percent for the household sector and 5 percent for the public 
sector (Laffargue and Yu 2014). Over the period 1992–2009, the household saving rate increased by 15 percentage 
points. Despite the fact that its income share of GDP declined from 70 percent to 61 percent, the household sector 
contributed more to the increase in the national saving rate than the government sector, whose savings as a share of 
GDP increased by 6 percentage points over the period (Yang, Zhang, and Zhou 2011). 
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saving rates across countries. We thus view the alternative explanations relevant to 
each of these economies as complementary to ours in accounting for the full dynam-
ics of savings. Our work is therefore partly related to a series of papers attempting 
to explain the large decline in the US household saving rate, summarized in Parker 
(2000) and Guidolin and La Jeunesse (2007),9 as well as to a large literature tack-
ling the “Chinese saving puzzle” (Modigliani and Cao 2004), recently surveyed in 
Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2011); and Yang (2012).10 In a nutshell, our work provides 
a micro-founded explanation for the emergence of a “global saving glut” (Bernanke 
2005) that induced a decline in the world interest rate and the subsequent saving 
divergence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops the theoretical framework 
and provides some key intuitions. Analytical results are derived, shedding light on 
the mechanisms through which fast growth and integration of emerging markets 
impinge on the global economy in our model. Section II investigates micro-level evi-
dence on saving behavior by age groups in China and the US. Section III  examines 
the  quantitative performance of a fully-calibrated model for these two economies. 
Section IV concludes.
I. Theory
The world economy consists of large open economies, populated by overlapping 
generations of consumers who live for three periods. Let  γ ∈ { y, m, o} denote a 
generation. Consumers supply one unit of labor when young ( γ = y ) and when in 
middle age ( γ = m ), and retire when old ( γ = o ). In youth, consumers are credit 
constrained, but the severity of that constraint differs across countries. In all other 
aspects our framework is standard: all countries use the same technology to pro-
duce one homogeneous good, which is used for consumption and investment, and is 
traded freely and costlessly. Preferences and production technologies have the same 
structure across countries. Labor is immobile across countries, and firms are subject 
to changes in country-specific productivity and labor force.
A. Production
Let  K t i denote the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period  t in country  i , 
and  e t i   L  y, t i +  L m, t i the total labor input employed in period  t , where  L γ, t i denotes the 
size of generation  γ and  e t i the relative productivity of young workers ( e t i < 1 ). The 
gross output in country  i is
(1)  Y t i =  ( K t i ) α   [ A t i ( e t i   L y, t i +  L m, t i ) ] 1−α  ,  
9 The decline in the US saving rate has been attributed to positive wealth effects (Poterba 2000; Juster et al. 
2006; Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek 2011); financial innovation and relaxation of borrowing constraints (Parker 
2000; Boz and Mendoza 2014; and Ferrero 2012); changes in social security and redistribution schemes (Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus 1996; Huggett and Ventura 2000). 
10 Some compelling explanations emphasize the role of precautionary savings (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2006; 
Chamon, Liu, and Prasad 2010; and Chamon and Prasad 2010); structural demographic changes (Curtis, Lugauer, 
and Mark 2011; Ge, Yang, and Zhang 2012; and Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin 2013); changes in life-income 
profiles and pension reforms (Song and Yang 2010; Guo and Perri 2012); gender imbalances and competition in the 
marriage market (Wei and Zhang 2011). 
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where  0 < α < 1 , and  A t i is country-specific productivity. The capital stock in 
country  i depreciates at rate  δ and is augmented by investment goods,  I t i , with law 
of motion
(2)  K t+1 i = (1 − δ )  K t i +  I t i  . 
Factor markets are competitive so that each factor, capital and labor, earns its mar-
ginal product. Thus, the wage rates per unit of labor in youth and middle age for 
country  i are
(3)  w y, t i =  e t i  (1 − α )  A t i   ( k t i ) α  ,    w m, t i = (1 − α )  A t i   ( k t i ) α  , 
where  k t i ≡  K t i  / [  A t i  (  e t i   L y, t i +  L m, t i  ) ] denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. 
The rental rate earned by capital in production equals the marginal prod-
uct of capital,  r K, t i = α  ( k t i ) α−1 , and the gross rate of return earned between 
period  t − 1 and  t in country  i is  R t i = 1 − δ +  r K, t i . Productivity and the 
size of consecutive cohorts grow at rates  g A, t i and  g L, t i , respectively, so that  A t i 
= (1 +  g A, t i  )  A t−1 i and  L  y, t i = (1 +  g L, t i  )  L  y, t−1 i .
B. Households
A consumer born in period  t earns the competitive wage rate  w y, t i when young 
and  w m, t+1 i in the following period. Let  c γ, t i denote the consumption of an agent in 
country  i belonging to generation  γ . The lifetime utility of a consumer born in period 
t in country  i is
(4)  U t i = u(  c y, t i  ) + βu(  c m, t+1 i  ) +  β 2  u(  c o, t+2 i  ), 
with standard isoelastic preferences  u(c )  =   ( c 1− 1 __σ − 1) / (1 −  1 __σ ) . The dis-
count factor  β satisfies  0 < β < 1 and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
 coefficient satisfies  σ ≤ 1 .11
Let  a γ, t+1 i denote the net asset holdings at the end of period  t of an agent belong-
ing to generation  γ . An agent born in period  t faces the following sequence of budget 
constraints:
(5)  c y, t i +  a y, t+1 i =   w y, t i  , 
(6)  c m, t+1 i +  a m, t+2 i =   w m, t+1 i +  R t+1 i   a y, t+1 i  , 
(7)  c o, t+2 i =   R t+2 i   a m, t+2 i  . 
11 Our analytical expressions are still valid when  σ > 1 , but some of our mechanisms rely on a sufficiently 
low e.i.s. coefficient. Most of the empirical literature since the seminal paper of Hall (1988) finds estimates of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution below 0.5 (see Ogaki and Reinhart 1998; Vissing-Jørgensen 2002; and Yogo 
2004 among others). The macro and asset pricing literature (discussed in Guvenen 2006) typically assumes higher 
values between 0.5 and 1. 
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When young, individuals can borrow in order to consume  ( a y, t+1 i < 0) . When 
 middle-aged, they earn the competitive wage, repay their loans, consume, and 
save for retirement. When old, they consume all available resources. A bequest 
motive is omitted for convenience but is introduced later in the quantitative analysis 
(Section III).
We assume that young agents are subject to credit constraints: they can only bor-
row up to a fraction  θ i of the present value of their future labor income,
(8)  a y, t+1 i ≥ −  θ i    
 w m, t+1 i  ______ R t+1 i 
  . 
The tightness of credit conditions, captured by  θ i , can differ across countries but is 
assumed constant over time.12 We analyze the case in which (8) is binding for all 
countries.13
ASSUMPTION 1: Credit constraints for the young are binding at all times in all 
countries.
This assumption is satisfied if two conditions hold: (i)  θ i is small enough— 
smaller than the fraction of intertemporal wealth that the young would consume 
in the absence of credit constraints; (ii) the wage profile is steep enough.14 When 
credit constraints are binding, the net asset position of the young is
(9)  a y, t+1 i = −  θ i    
 w m, t+1 i  ______ R t+1 i 
  . 
The net asset position of a middle-aged agent at the end of period  t is obtained from 
the Euler condition that links  c m, t i and  c o, t+1 i , yielding
(10)  a m, t+1 i   =   1 _____________ 
1 +  β −σ   (  R t+1 i  ) 1−σ 
 (1 −  θ i  )  w m, t i  . 
Changes in  R t+1 i affects middle-aged asset holdings through a substitution and 
income effect, the latter dominating when  σ < 1 .
12 We are interested in a scenario where financial development lags economic development, so that household 
credit constraints remain significantly more severe in emerging countries than in advanced economies. 
13 This assumption is made for analytical convenience but our mechanism goes through as long as the credit 
constraint is binding in the more constrained economies. The exact nature of the credit constraint matters only 
insofar as a fall in interest rate leads to a greater fall in the saving rate of the young in less constrained economies. 
If the credit constraint was independent of the interest rate (e.g., a function of current wages only), the saving rate 
divergence would be weaker, unless the constraint does not bind in advanced economies. 
14 The conditions are  θ i <  η t ∗ and  w m, t+1 i /(  R t+1 i   w y, t i  ) > (1 −  η t ∗  )/(  η t ∗ −  θ i  ) , for all  t , where  η t ∗ 
≡ [  β −2σ   (  R t+1 i   R t+2 i  ) 1−σ  ]/ { 1 +  β −σ   (  R t+2 i  ) 1−σ  [ 1 +  β −σ   (  R t+1 i  ) 1−σ  ]}. In the case of log utility, these conditions 
amount to  θ i <  (1 + β +  β 2  ) −1 , and  w m, t+1 i  /(  R t+1 i   w y, t i  ) > β(1 + β )/[ 1 −  θ i  (1 + β +  β 2  ) ] . 
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C. Autarky Equilibrium
Under financial autarky, market clearing requires that the total capital stock accu-
mulated at the end of period  t is equal to aggregate country wealth,
(11)  K t+1 i =  L  y, t i   a y, t+1 i +  L m, t i   a m, t+1 i  . 
Along with (9) and (10), this gives the law of motion for  k i , the  capital-effective-labor 
ratio in country  i . In the full depreciation case ( δ = 1 ), the dynamic of  k i is given 
implicitly by15
    (1 +  g A,t+1 i ) (1 +  g L,t i ) [1 +  e t+1 i (1 +  g L,t+1 i ) +  θ i   1 − α _____α ]  k t+1 i 
     =   (1 −  θ i ) (1 − α)  ___________________   
1 +  β −σ {α ( k t+1 i ) α−1 } 
1−σ
 
  ( k t i ) α .
Figure 3 depicts the autarkic law of motion for capital for two different values of the 
credit constraint parameter,  θ L and  θ H >  θ L . We now characterize the impact of  θ i 
on the steady state of the economy. To zero in on the effect of differences in credit 
constraints, we assume constant and identical productivity and labor force growth 
rates  g A and  g L across countries, and a fixed relative productivity of young workers  e .
THEOREM 1: Suppose that  δ = 1 . There exists a unique, stable, autarky steady state. 
All else equal, more constrained economies have a higher  capital-to-efficient-labor 
ratio ( d  k i /d  θ i < 0 ) and a lower interest rate ( d  R i /d  θ i > 0 ).
The proof of Theorem 1 and all other proofs are relegated to Appendix A. More 
constrained economies accumulate more capital as a result of less dissaving of the 
young and lower debt repayment of the middle-aged, and hence feature a lower rate 
of return in the long run. In the case  σ = 1 , the autarky steady-state interest rate in 
country  i is
(12)  R i = (1 +  g A  )(1 +  g L  )  1 + β ____β   
α [ 1 + e(1 +  g L  ) ]  +  θ i  (1 − α )    ___________________(1 − α ) (1 −  θ i )  . 
This expression shows that the rate of return is also increasing in productivity and 
labor growth rates,  g A and  g L , and in the relative efficiency of young workers  e —all 
of which raise the marginal productivity of capital.16 Demographics matter not only 
through the impact on labor force growth, but also on the population composition: 
a higher proportion of young agents relative to middle-aged agents due to high  g L 
15 Most of our theoretical results are derived for  δ = 1 , but they hold more generally. 
16 The impact of productivity growth differentials and effects related to cross-country differences in demograph-
ics and income profiles on the transition path are discussed in Section III. 
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increases the proportion of borrowers relative to savers and hence puts upward pres-
sure on the rate of return to capital.
D. Integrated Equilibrium
Under financial integration, capital flows across borders until rates of return are 
equalized across countries. Financial integration in period  t implies that  R t+1 i =  R t+1 
and  k t+1 i =  k  t+1 , for all  i . The capital market equilibrium condition becomes
(13)  ∑ 
i
   K t+1 i =  ∑ 
i
 ( L y, t i    a y, t+1 i +  L m, t i    a m, t+1 i ) ,  
which, along with (9) and (10), gives the law of motion for  k  t . Next, we characterize 
the integrated steady state where the growth rates of productivity and labor, as well 
as the relative efficiency of young workers, are identical across countries.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that  δ = 1 . Let  θ L ≡  min i   {  θ i  } ,  θ H ≡  max i   {  θ i  } , 
with  θ L ≠  θ H . The steady-state world interest rate  R satisfies
(14)  R( θ L ) < R < R( θ H ), 
¯
kt
k t
+1
k(θH) k(θL)k(θ)
Autarky (θH)
Autarky (θL) 
Integration (θ)  ¯
Figure 3. Law of Motion and Steady State: Autarky and Integration
Notes: Parameter values are σ = 0.5, β = 0.97 (annual), α = 0.28, δ = 10 percent (annual),  θ H = 0.2, 
 θ L = 0.02,   g A = 1.5 percent (annual),  g L = 1 percent, e = 0.33. A period lasts 20 years.
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where  R(θ ) denotes the autarky steady-state interest rate for credit constraint 
parameter  θ .
Proposition 1 points to the first factor that can cause a fall in the rate of return 
faced by less constrained economies: financial integration with more constrained 
ones. Figure 3 illustrates this effect in a two-country case, assuming that the less 
constrained country starts at its autarkic steady state  k( θ H  ) whereas the more con-
strained one is initially capital scarce—so that the two economies have identical 
 capital-effective-labor ratios at the time of opening.17 Upon integration, the transition 
path of capital is determined by the integrated law of motion, which lies in between 
the autarkic ones. Effectively, the world economy behaves like a closed-economy 
with credit constraint parameter  
_
 θ ≡  ∑ i    λ i  θ i  , where  λ i denotes the relative size of 
country  i measured by its share in world effective labor
(15)   λ i ≡   A i,t (e L  y,t 
i +  L  m,t i ) 
  _______________  ∑ j    A j,t (e L  y,t j +  L  m,t j ) 
 .
Along the convergence to the integrated steady state  k( θ ̅) depicted in Figure 3, the 
world interest rate experiences a sustained decline.
The second factor that can lead to such a decline is faster growth in more con-
strained economies. Indeed in the long run, the world interest rate is determined 
(up to a monotonously increasing transformation) as a weighted average of the 
autarky steady-state interest rates of all countries, with weight on country  i increas-
ing in  λ i .18 Hence as the more constrained economies grow faster and account for a 
greater share of the world economy over time, the world interest rate falls.
PROPOSITION 2: A relative expansion of the more constrained economies (i.e., an 
increase in the share  λ i of a country with low  θ i ) causes a fall in the world steady-
state interest rate. A relative expansion of less constrained economies has the oppo-
site effect.
E. Saving and Investment
We now show that asymmetric credit constraints lead to heterogeneous responses 
of saving rates to the endogenous fall in the world interest rate across countries, both 
at the aggregate level and for each generation.19 In the integrated steady state, the 
aggregate net saving to GDP ratio of country  i is
   S 
i  __
 Y i 
= −  g ____________ 
1 + e(1 +  g L ) (1 − α)  
 θ i  __
R
+  g _____ 
1 + g  
1 ____________ 
1 + e(1 +  g L ) (1 − α)  
1 −  θ i ____________  
1 +  β −σ   R 1−α ,
17 This assumption is made for the ease of graphical representation. One way to think about it is that the more 
constrained economy experiences an episode of fast productivity growth before integration, which drives its capi-
tal-effective-labor ratio down at the time of opening. 
18 This statement follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1. In the special case where  σ = 1 , an alter-
native representation of the long-run world interest rate is given by equation (12) , substituting the world average 
credit constraint parameter  θ ̅ in place of  θ i . 
19 Formal definitions of savings, at the aggregate level and for each generation, are given in the online Appendix. 
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where  R is at its steady-state value, and  g ≡ (1 +  g A  )(1 +  g L  ) − 1 > 0 . 
The equation shows that more constrained economies (lower  θ i ) place a greater 
weight on the middle-aged savers and less weight on young borrowers, resulting 
in a higher saving rate. Moreover, it implies that in response to a fall in the world 
interest rate  R , the saving rate increases by more in the more constrained econ-
omy,  ∂ 2  (S/Y )/ ∂ θ ∂ R > 0 . These slope differences, combined with differences in 
levels, imply that a fall in  R induces a divergence in saving rates across countries. 
Given the fall in interest rate caused by an increase in the relative size of the more 
constrained economies (Proposition 2), the next proposition follows.
PROPOSITION 3: A relative expansion of the more constrained economies (i.e., 
an increase in the share  λ i of a country with low  θ i ) causes a greater dispersion of 
steady-state saving rates across countries.
Away from the steady state, it is useful to decompose the response of the saving 
rate into the response of each generation’s saving rate (expressed as a share of GDP 
for the purpose of aggregation). We show in Appendix A that20
 S y,t 
i = − (1 +  g A,t+1 i )  1 +  g L,t 
i 
 ______________  
1 +  e t i (1 +  g L,t i ) 
 1 − α ______
 k t 
α   
 θ i  ____ 
 R t+1 
 ( α ___________  R t+1 − 1 + δ) 
 α ____ 
1−α ,
  
 S m, t i  ____ Y t i 
   =   1 − α ___________ 
1 +  e t i  (1 +  g L, t i  )[ 1 −  θ 
i _________ 
1 +  β −σ   R t+1 1−σ 
+   θ i  __ R t] , 
  
 S o, t i  ___ Y t i 
 = −  1 _______ 
1 +  g A, t i 
  1 ________ 
1 +  g L, t−1 i 
  1 − α  ______________ 
1 +  e t i  (1 +  g L, t i  )
  1 −  θ i ___________ 
1 +  β −σ   R t 1−σ 
   (  k t−1  ___ k t ) 
α
  . 
These expressions indicate that the response of savings to the interest rate  R t+1 var-
ies across generations, and that the strength of the response varies across countries. 
The following proposition characterizes the partial effects of a drop in  R t+1 on the 
savings of the young and middle-aged, abstracting from the direct effect of factors 
causing the interest rate to fall.
PROPOSITION 4: All else constant, in response to a fall in the interest rate  R t+1 , 
the young borrow more while the middle-aged save more under the condition that 
σ < 1 . The increase in borrowing by the young is larger in less constrained econ-
omies (high  θ i ), while the increase in saving of the middle-aged is larger in more 
constrained economies (low  θ i ).
Proposition 4 implies that the net response of the aggregate saving rate to a fall 
in interest rate depends on  θ i : a high  θ i gives more importance to the young bor-
rowers’ larger dissavings, whereas a low  θ i gives more importance to the rise in 
middle-aged’s savings.
20 Normalizing by each generation’s factor income yields similar expressions, up to some multiplicative terms 
common across countries. 
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Also worthy of note is that the presence of credit constraints limits the negative 
impact of future growth  g A, t+1 i on the saving rate: the dissavings of the young can 
only increase up to the extent permitted by the binding credit constraints. Thus, the 
standard wealth effect of growth on saving is mitigated when growth is experienced 
by a country with tight credit constraints. In addition, the wealth effect of growth 
does not operate on middle-aged consumers when the old have no wage income. In 
the more general case, this wealth effect is weaker when the income profile falls in 
old age.
Investment is governed by the same forces that underlie the neoclassical growth 
model. Under financial integration, differences in investment-output ratios across 
countries are largely determined by their relative growth prospects. With full depre-
ciation ( δ = 1 ), investment to GDP ratios obey
(16)   I t 
i / Y t i  ____ I t j / Y t j 
=  1 +  g ̃  t+1 
i  ______
1 +  g ̃  t+1 j 
 , 
where  1 +  g ̃  t+1 i ≡ (1 +  g A, t+1 i  ) [ 1 +  e t+1 i  (1 +  g L, t+1 i  ) ]  / [  e t i +  (1 +  g L, t i  ) −1  ] 
denotes the combined growth rate in productivity and effective labor input in coun-
try  i .
F. Discussion
The model can be used to shed light on how financial integration of emerging 
markets and their faster growth impinge on the world economy. Consider the fol-
lowing experiment where a fast-growing developing country with tight constraints, 
integrates with an advanced economy.21 If the developing country starts out by being 
capital scarce, it can feature a higher autarkic interest rate than the advanced econ-
omy. After opening, the rapid decline of its (shadow) autarkic interest rate owing 
to capital accumulation, along with its increasing weight in the integrated global 
economy, leads the world interest rate to decline (Proposition 2).22 Saving rates 
diverge across countries due to their asymmetric responses to the fall in interest rates 
(Proposition 3). The rise in saving rate in the developing economy is driven by the 
middle-aged, while the decline in the advanced economy is driven by the young. 
Although the investment rate also rises in the fast-growing developing country, the 
rise in its saving rate soon dominates, leading to a current account surplus.
By contrast, if credit constraints were absent (or not binding), the aggregate sav-
ing rate would fall in the fast-growing economy as the young borrow more against 
their higher future income. Investment would rise and the country would run a large 
21 The illustrative results from a numerical experiment are presented in detail in Section 2.6 of the longer work-
ing paper version (Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin 2015a). A comprehensive quantitative analysis is deferred until 
Section III. 
22 Three factors determine the dynamics of interest rates. The first two factors pin down the paths of interest 
rates that would prevail if both economies remained in autarky throughout. The “growth effect” tends to raise the 
interest rate in the developing country due to higher marginal productivity of capital, while the “convergence effect” 
tends to lower it as the country rapidly accumulates capital from a capital-scarce starting point. After the opening 
of capital markets, the “integration effect” determines the world interest rate according to the relative size of each 
economy. The interest rate falls throughout the transition if the last two effects dominate. 
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current account deficit. The fall in the world interest rate would be mitigated,23 and 
the interest rate would not experience a prolonged decline. Saving rates would tend 
to converge across economies as agents respond similarly to changes in the interest 
rate in all countries. A model with binding but equally loose credit constraints in 
both economies would generate qualitatively similar results. Thus, both the presence 
of credit constraints and their asymmetry are essential for our results.24 Growth is 
also key since in the case of mere financial integration, the world interest rate would 
barely fall, and the divergence in saving rates would be much smaller.
II. Micro Evidence on Savings by Age Groups
Motivated by the predictions of our theory at the micro level, we now provide 
direct evidence on savings by age groups in advanced and emerging economies and 
their evolution over the last two decades. Because of limited data availability, we 
focus on two exemplary countries—the US and China. These two economies are 
the most important contributors to global imbalances, and arguably occupy opposite 
positions in the spectrum of household credit constraint tightness. A number of com-
plex issues arise when using household survey data to construct age-saving profiles. 
This section describes a careful treatment of these issues and the way we attempt to 
deal with potential biases. These micro findings are used subsequently to calibrate 
the quantitative model and evaluate its performance. Readers interested only in the 
quantitative implications can proceed directly to Section III.
A. Evidence for the United States 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) provides the most comprehensive data 
on disaggregated consumption, and is therefore our primary data source for the US. 
Annual data from 1986 to 2008 are available for six age groups: under 25, 25–34, 
35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and above 65. Details of the data are provided in Appendix B.
Underreporting Biases.—The main issue involved in using CEX data is their 
sharp discrepancy with the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data. 
This discrepancy is well-documented in Slesnick (1992); Laitner and Silverman 
(2005); Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010); and Aguiar and Hurst (2013); and 
arises from underreporting of both consumption and income in the CEX data. The 
degree of underreporting has become more severe over time for consumption but not 
for income, the consequence of which is a stark rise in the aggregate saving rate as 
computed from CEX data, compared to an actual decline as measured in NIPA data 
(Figure 4). Some important corrections of the CEX are therefore needed to estimate 
reasonable age-saving profiles for the US.
23 The interest rate could even rise temporarily if the growth effect dominates the convergence effect. 
24 The shape of the age-income profile, typical of an OLG model, is also important for the savings divergence. 
Credit constraints are binding for the young because they start with a lower labor income. Moreover as noted above, 
the positive wealth effect of growth and falling interest rates on middle-aged consumers is strongly mitigated when 
their income in old age is low. A flatter age-income profile would bring the model closer to a standard representative 
agent model without constraints. 
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Correction Method.—Following previous works (Parker, Vissing-Jørgensen, and 
Ziebarth 2009 among others), we assume that NIPA data is well measured, and 
propose a correction method to bring about consistency between CEX and NIPA 
data. Our correction method adjusts income uniformly across all age groups so as 
to match NIPA data. On the consumption side, we take into account the fact that the 
degree of underreporting may vary across goods, which becomes a concern if the 
composition of the consumption basket differs across age groups (see Aguiar and 
Hurst 2013 for recent evidence). While allowing the degree of underreporting in 
CEX to vary over time and across consumption goods, the correction method relies 
on the assumption that it is constant across age groups.
In practice, to correct for underreporting in consumption, we use CEX and 
NIPA data on aggregate consumption for 15 sectors to construct time-varying, 
 sector-specific adjustment factors  χ kt =  C kt NIPA / C kt CEX , where  C kt  denotes aggre-
gate consumption of good  k in dataset   .25 For all sectors,  χ kt is greater than 1, 
and rises over time as the underreporting bias in CEX consumption becomes more 
severe. We use the sector-specific factors to adjust CEX sectoral consumption data 
by age: given  c jkt CEX the average consumption of goods of sector  k by individuals of 
age  j as reported in CEX, we define  c ̂jkt =  χ kt    c jkt CEX . The adjusted consumption 
expenditure for age  j is then obtained as  c ̂j, t =  ∑ k     c ̂jkt .26 Similarly, our adjusted 
25 The 15 sectors matched between NIPA and CEX are: Food and alcoholic beverages, Shelter, Utilities and 
public services, Household expenses, Clothing and apparel, Vehicles purchases, Gas and motor oil, Other vehicle 
expenses, Public transportation, Health, Entertainment, Education, Tobacco, Miscellaneous and cash contributions, 
Life/personal insurance. 
26 Another issue is that health expenditures are treated differently in NIPA and CEX. Health expenditures 
in CEX are restricted to “out-of-pocket” expenses, but NIPA also includes health contributions (Medicare and 
Medicaid), leading to very large adjustment factor  χ health . This mostly affects our consumption estimates for the 
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Figure 4. US Aggregate Saving Rate: NIPA versus Unadjusted CEX
Source: CEX and BEA for the NIPA rate.
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measure of income for age  j is  y ̂j, t =  ( Y t NIPA / Y t CEX  ) y j, t CEX , where  y j, t CEX denotes the 
average income reported in CEX for age  j in year  t , and  Y t D the aggregate income in 
dataset   . By construction, the corrected consumption and income measures match 
NIPA in the aggregate.27 Finally, the estimated saving rate for age  j in period  t 
is  s ̂j, t = (  y ̂j, t −  c ̂j, t  )/ y ̂j, t .
Corrected US Age-Saving Profiles.—Figure 5 displays the estimated saving rates 
by age groups for the years 1988 and 2008 using our correction method. Age-saving 
profiles are in line with the life-cycle theory, and their shapes show some interest-
ing evolution. In two decades, the group of young people (under 25) saw a decline 
of 12.7 percentage points in their saving rate, while those between 35–54 a small 
increase of about 2.3 percentage points, and the eldest group a large decline of about 
19 percentage points.
B. Evidence for China
The main data source for China is the Urban Household Survey (UHS) con-
ducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, available for the year 1986 and annu-
ally over the period 1992–2009. We use the sample of urban households which 
covers 112 prefectures across 9 representative provinces, with an overall coverage 
of about 5,500 households in the 1992 to 2001 surveys and 16,000 households in 
the 2002 to 2009 surveys.28 The UHS data records detailed information on income, 
old, for whom “out-of-pocket” health expenditures constitute a large share of their consumption basket in CEX. We 
address this concern by adjusting sectoral adjustment factors for mis-measurement in health expenditures while still 
matching NIPA consumption data in the aggregate. See details in the online Appendix. 
27 A small discrepancy remains for consumption since NIPA includes expenditure types (e.g., “Net foreign 
travel and expenditures abroad by US residents” and “Final consumption expenditures of nonprofit institutions 
serving households”) which cannot be matched with CEX categories. 
28 The 1986 survey covers a different sample of 12,185 households across 31 provinces. 
1988
Un
de
r 2
5
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
Ab
ov
e 
65
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
2008
Un
de
r 2
5
25
–3
4
35
–4
4
45
–5
4
55
–6
4
Ab
ov
e 
65
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Figure 5. Age-Saving Profiles for the US
Notes: Estimates of saving rates by age groups are obtained using CEX adjusted data (sectoral-specific adjustment 
factors, correcting for health expenditures). Details of the correction techniques are given in the online Appendix.
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consumption expenditures, and demographic characteristics of households. It also 
provides employment, wages, and other characteristics of individuals in the house-
hold. Further information about the data can be found in Appendix B.
The main issue that arises with UHS data is that, while income is available at 
the individual level, consumption is only available at the household level. For this 
reason, previous studies analyzing age-specific saving behavior in China use house-
hold-level data. That is, the saving rate they impute to a certain age is the average 
household saving rate computed over all households whose head is of this age. 
Following this approach, Song and Yang (2010); Chamon and Prasad (2010); and 
Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2010) find evidence against standard life-cycle motives of 
saving in China. In particular, they find that the traditional hump-shaped  age-saving 
profile is replaced by a U-shaped profile in recent years, with saving rates being 
highest for the young and close to retirement age, and lowest for the middle-aged. 
This would run counter to our prediction that the middle-aged savers in China 
should have contributed the most to the rise in household saving rate in the last two 
decades. However, the “household approach” is subject to potential measurement 
errors, which we now examine.
Aggregation and Selection Biases.—Deaton and Paxson (2000) have forcefully 
shown the problems associated with using the household approach to construct 
age-saving profiles in the presence of multi-generational households. If a large frac-
tion of households comprise members that are at very different life-cycle stages, the 
age-saving profile obtained from household data will be obscured by an aggregation 
bias. For instance, suppose that middle-aged individuals have a high saving rate as 
they save for retirement, but middle-aged household heads live with younger adults 
or elderly members who have much lower saving rates. In this case, the household 
approach would lead to an under-estimation of the saving rate of the middle-aged. 
More generally, the aggregation bias tends to flatten the true age-saving profile. A 
second potential bias arises from the possibility that household headship is not ran-
dom. If being a head at a certain age is correlated with certain characteristics (such 
as income) that affect saving behavior, the age-saving profile estimated by the house-
hold approach would suffer from a selection bias. Moreover, any  time-variation in 
these two biases would affect the estimated change in age-specific saving behavior 
over time.
A multi-generational household is the norm in the case of China, thus mak-
ing the aggregation bias a serious concern (Table 1). In urban households, more 
than 50 percent of individuals live in multi-generational households (defined as 
Table 1—Multi-Generational Households in China
1992 2009
Two-generation 41 37
Three-generation 15 18
Note: Share of individuals living in households comprising two or three generations (in 
percent).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UHS data.
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 households in which the maximum age difference between two adults is above 
18 years), and roughly one out of six in households with three different genera-
tions.29  Multi-generational households are observed when young adults (typically 
in their twenties) stay in their parents’ household or when older individuals (typi-
cally in their seventies) live with their children. A closer look at the data shows that, 
toward the end of the sample period, young adults tend to stay longer with their 
parents, while the elderly tend to join their children’s household at a later age as 
a result of an increase in life expectancy. These evolutions are likely to introduce 
some bias in the estimates of changes in age-specific saving rates obtained from the 
household approach.
Figure 6 offers suggestive evidence of a potential bias arising from the fact that 
household heads are not selected randomly. The figure displays the income pre-
mium of household heads as a function age, with the average income of heads of 
a given age expressed as the log ratio of the average income of all individuals of 
that age. Both young and elderly household heads are significantly richer than their 
non-household head counterparts. This is of no surprise—only the richer individ-
uals can afford to live independently when young or in old age. If high individual 
income is correlated with high individual saving rate, the household approach would 
therefore tend to overestimate the saving rates of the young and of the elderly. The 
evolution of the income premium over time, apparent in the figure, suggests that the 
selection bias is likely to be more severe for the elderly in 1992, and more severe for 
the young in 2009.
Projection Method.—To improve upon the household approach, the key challenge 
is to identify individual consumption. Our approach applies a projection method 
proposed by Chesher (1997, 1998) and Deaton and Paxson (2000) to disaggregate 
household consumption into individual consumption, from which we estimate new 
age-saving profiles. Essentially, the idea is to recover the consumption of each indi-
vidual member of the household using cross-sectional variations in the composition 
of households as a source of identification. In practice, this is done by projecting 
household consumption on the number of household members belonging to various 
age groups, controlling for observable household characteristics. Following Chesher 
(1997), we conduct a nonlinear least squares estimation of the following model for 
each year:
  C h = exp (γ ·   Z h  ) (  ∑ j≥19  c j    N h, j ) +  ϵ h  , 
where  C h is the aggregate consumption of household  h ,  N h, j is the number of members 
of age  j in household  h , and  Z h denotes a set of household-specific controls (income 
group, number of adults, number of children, uni- versus multi-generational, etc.).30 
29 Any household with one adult or several adults belonging to the same generation, possibly with a child, is 
considered as unigenerational. 
30 This assumes that individual consumption can be written as multiplicatively separable functions of individual 
age and household characteristics. The identification therefore relies on the restriction that the effect of household 
characteristics on individual consumption is independent of age. 
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The estimated consumption of an individual of age  j living in a household with char-
acteristics  Z h is then equal to  exp ( γ ˆ  ·   Z h  )  c ̂j . Details of the methodology are given 
in the online Appendix.
Limitations and Robustness Checks.—Our estimation method is not without 
potential issues. One possible concern is that, if intergenerational transfers within 
the household are important, our estimated age-saving profiles could be biased. As 
a robustness check, we implement an alternative methodology in which  age-saving 
profiles are estimated on the restricted sample of unigenerational households, which 
constitute more than  40 percent of the entire sample.31 The estimated profiles are 
similar to the ones produced by Chesher’s projection method, albeit using a different 
sample of households and a different identification strategy.
Another potential issue comes from the fact that household composition is treated 
as exogenous by Chesher’s method, although households may not be formed ran-
domly. For instance, if the decision made by young people to live alone is positively 
correlated with their propensity to save, one might be concerned that the projec-
tion method artificially increases the young’s saving rate.32 The online Appendix 
provides a number of robustness checks to address this type of selection issue. In 
31 This alternative approach, including the way observations are reweighted to match the characteristics of the 
whole sample along some important observable characteristics (income in particular), is described in detail in the 
online Appendix, where the issue of transfers is also discussed more generally. 
32 Such selection bias would be a concern if the projection method identifies individual consumption by age 
mostly based on unigenerational observations, rather than based on variations in the composition of multigenera-
tional households. 
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Figure 6. Income Premium of Household Heads in China
Note: Income premium of household heads is the log difference between the average income of heads of
a given age and the average income of all individuals of that same age. 
Source: UHS (1992–2009).
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 particular, when implemented on a restricted sample which excludes unigenerational 
households containing at least one individual under 30 or above 65, the projection 
method is found to produce very similar results.33
Estimated Age-Saving Profiles for China.—Figure 7 exhibits the estimated 
age-saving profiles, at the beginning and at the end of the sample period.34 In the 
online Appendix, we show that our estimates differ substantially from the ones pro-
duced by the household approach based on the age of the household head. Echoing 
the results of Deaton and Paxson (2000) for Taiwan and Thailand, we find that 
the age-saving profiles computed by the individual approach are more in accord 
with the life-cycle theory of saving.35 In particular, the young do save less than the 
 middle-aged, especially so in the most recent period. Over time, we observe a large 
increase in the saving rate of the middle-aged, between 15–20 percentage points. 
The saving rate of the youngest also increases, but significantly less. The striking 
increase in the saving rate of the elderly (above  65 ) is quite peculiar and seems at 
odds with standard life-cycle motives. However, it is important to recognize that, 
33 Note also that in identifying individual consumption, Chesher’s method already controls for household 
income and household composition— in particular, if individuals of a certain age living alone consumed differently 
from those living with  N other adults, this effect would at least partly be captured by the method. The question is 
whether there could remain other unobservable characteristics, correlated with both household formation and pro-
pensity to consume, which we do not account for. Our results, however, suggest that, once controlling for income, 
individuals of a given age living in unigenerational households do not have different saving behavior than those 
living in multigenerational households. 
34 For the beginning of the sample period, due to the lack of observations in 1988, we show the estimated profile 
for 1992 along with averages over the first three available years to minimize issues related to the smaller size of our 
sample in early years. 
35 We also estimated profiles from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data, available for 1995 and 
2002, finding consistent results across methods and across surveys. 
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Figure 7. Estimated Age-Saving Profiles for China, Individual Method
Note: Saving rates are estimated using a projection method to identify individual consumption (Chesher 1997), con-
trolling for household characteristics.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UHS data. See online Appendix for additional details.
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because of their modest income share, the old’s contribution to aggregate savings 
remains small.36
C. Summary of Micro Evidence
Our baseline three-period model predicts that in the face of a fall in the world 
interest rate (caused by capital markets integration and fast growth in Asia), (i) the 
saving rate of the young falls by more in developed countries; (ii) the saving rate of 
the middle-aged increases by more in emerging markets. As a result, age-saving pro-
files across countries become more distant from each other over time. In the data, the 
change in the young’s saving rate over time is markedly different across the US and 
China, leading to a widening of the cross-country difference in their saving rates. 
Meanwhile, the saving rate of the middle-aged (35–54) in China rose by about 15 
percentage points more in China than in the US. Within countries, the evolution of 
saving rates across age groups makes the profiles more hump-shaped, both in theory 
and in the data. Overall, apart from the large increase in the saving rate of the elderly 
in China, our empirical findings are broadly supportive of the qualitative predictions 
of our theory.
III. Quantitative Analysis
Equipped with facts on the macro and micro level, we now assess the ability of 
the model to match the evolution of saving rates in the US and China over the period 
1988–2008—both on the aggregate level and by age groups. The quantitative model 
enriches the baseline model of Section I along several dimensions, and is fully cal-
ibrated to the experiences of these two economies. First, we increase the number 
of periods/generations in order to yield more refined micro and aggregate predic-
tions. Having more periods allows us to incorporate the exact shapes of age-income 
profiles across countries, and their variations over time. Second, we introduce a 
bequest motive to allow for a savings initiative by the old. The demographic evo-
lution in each country is also calibrated to the data—thus incorporating the aging 
of population in both countries. Model parameters that are not directly observable 
are calibrated to micro and macro data for the US and China at the beginning of the 
sample period.
A. A Multi-Period OLG Model with Asymmetric Constraints
A brief description of the quantitative model follows. Unless specified otherwise, 
the notations are retained from Section I.
36 Although the reasons explaining the increase in Chinese elderly’s saving rate lie outside of the model and 
are beyond the scope of this paper, we can speculate that it is in large part driven by the rise in life expectancy and 
increased out-of-pocket medical expenditures (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010 argue that these factors are key to 
explain the elderly’s saving behavior in the US). Life expectancy in China rose from 68.9 in 1985 to 75.2 in 2010 
(UN population prospects 2012 revision). Out-of-pocket expenditures for people over 65 increased by 22 percent 
per year between 1995–2002 (Meng and Yeo 2005). 
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Preferences and Bequests.—We consider agents whose economic life runs for 
J + 1 periods. Age is indexed by  j = 0,  .  .  . , J . We let  c j, t i denote the consumption 
of an agent of age  j in period  t and country  i . In order to obtain a more realistic 
saving behavior for the old, we augment our baseline model with a bequest motive 
along the lines of Abel (2001). The lifetime utility of an agent born in period  t in 
country  i is
(17)  U t i =  ∑ 
j=0
J
  β  j  u ( c j, t+j i ) + ϕ  β  J  u ( R t+J+1 i   b t+J i  ) ,  
where  b t i denotes the amount of bequest left in period  t by an agent born in period 
t − J , and  ϕ captures the strength of the bequest motive. Agents of age  j < J 
receive a fraction  ϑ j of the bequests left in every period. Thus the amount of bequests 
received by an agent of age  j in period  t , denoted by  q j, t i , is related to  b t i as follows
(18)  q j, t i =  ϑ j     L t−J 
i  ____ L t−j i 
   b t i  ,  
where  L t i denotes the size of the generation born in period  t .
Production.—The production sector is analogous to the one in the qualitative 
model. Gross output in country  i is
(19)  Y t i =  ( K t i ) α [ A t i  ∑ j=0
J
  e j,t 
i  L t−j i ] 
1−α
 =  A t i  
_
 L t 
i  ( k t i ) α ,
where  
_ L t i ≡  ∑ j=0 J   e j, t i   L t−j i denotes the total efficiency-weighted population, 
and  k t i =  K t i  /( A t i   
_ L t i ) denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The efficiency 
weights  {  e j, t i  } j=0 J capture the shape of the age-income profile in period  t and country 
i . Indeed, the competitive wage received by agent of age  j in country  i in period 
t is  w j, t i =  e j, t i  (1 − α)  A t i   (  k t i  ) α . The gross rate of return between  t − 1 and  t 
is  R t 
i = 1 − δ + α ( k t i ) α−1 .
Credit Constraints.—Consider the intertemporal problem of a consumer born 
in period  t and country  i . This agent faces a sequence of gross rates of return 
 {  R t+j+1 i  } j=0 J , labor income  {  w j, t+j i  } j=0 J , and bequest transfers  {  q j, t+j i  } j=0 J−1 . 
Let  a j, t+j i denote his end-of-period net asset holdings at age  j . Flow budget con-
straints are
(20)  c j, t+j i +  a j, t+j i   =   R t+j i   a j−1, t+j−1 i +  w j, t i +  q j, t i  ,   0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1,  
(21)  c J, t+J i +  b t+J i   =   R t+J i   a J−1, t+J−1 i +  w J, t+J i   ,  
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with  a −1, t−1 i = 0 . Define the discounted present value of current and future labor 
income
(22)  H j, t i =  w j, t i +  ∑ τ  =1 
J−j
   w j+τ, t+τ 
i  __________ ∏ s=1 τ   R t+s i 
  ,   0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, 
and  H J, t i =  w J, t i . The credit constraint faced by the agent at age  j ≤ J − 1 is
(23)  a j, t+j i ≥ −  θ i    
 H j+1, t+j+1 i  ________ R t+j+1 i 
  . 
Equilibrium.—We solve for the autarkic and integrated steady states of the 
model, as well as its transitory dynamics for a given evolution of productivity, demo-
graphics and efficiency parameters. In autarky, the model equilibrium is given by a 
path for the capital-effective-labor ratio  k t i and bequests  ( { q j, t i } j=0 J−1  ,  b t i ) such that: 
(i) all agents maximize their intertemporal utility (equation (17)) with respect to 
their consumption decisions, subject to the sequence of budget constraints (equa-
tions (20)–(21)) and credit constraints (equation (23)); (ii) the consistency con-
dition (equation (18)) between bequests received and bequests left is satisfied; 
(iii) the market for capital clears in every period. Under financial integration, a sim-
ilar definition of an equilibrium holds, with the market for capital clearing globally. 
When solving for equilibrium, the presence of bequests adds a layer of complexity 
for the reason that the paths of capital and bequests have to be determined together 
in a dynamic fixed point problem. A detailed description of the numerical solution 
method is provided in the online Appendix.
B. Calibration
Two economies are considered in the quantitative analysis, the US and China, 
i ∈ { US, CH} . Each period lasts for 5 years and agents live for  11 periods, which 
map into the following age brackets: under 25, 25–29, 30–34, … , 65–69, and above 
70. We consider an experiment where China grows faster than the US over four 
decades, from period  − 3 to period  5 (corresponding to 1973–2013), and where the 
two economies integrate financially in period  0 (i.e, 1988) after 15 years of acceler-
ated growth in China.37 Table 2 provides a complete summary of the model calibra-
tion. We now give a detailed description of our calibration methodology.
Demographics.—The age distribution for each country and its evolution over 
time are obtained from the World Population Prospects data, sampled every five 
years since 1970 (United Nations 2011).38 For each country, the  demographic 
37 The financial integration of China has been very progressive. A first accelerated phase of financial opening 
occurred in the late 1980s, followed by another one in the first half of the 1990s as Deng Xiaoping called for a faster 
pace of reforms (Southern Tour in 1992). See Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) for a detailed chronology. 
We use 1988 as the integration date since a sustained Chinese current account deficit is observed in the late 1980s. 
Simulations using 1993 as integration date produce very similar results, with a slightly larger deficit at opening. 
38 Data availability limits us to set the demographic structure in 1968 (resp. 1973 up to 2008) to the one mea-
sured in the data for the year 1970 (resp. 1975 up to 2010). 
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growth rate before 1970 and the sequence of growth rates  g L, t i post-1970 are chosen 
to best fit the observed age distributions from 1970 to 2010. Although the model 
does not have enough degrees of freedom to perfectly fit the data, our calibration 
produces a close match to the overall demographic structure, as shown in Table 3. 
Implied demographic growth rates are reported in Table 2. The main feature of the 
data is the large fall in population growth in China starting in 1990, largely a result 
of fertility controls (one-child policy), and the ensuing rapid aging of the population 
(see Table 3). Post 2008, the population growth rate is assumed to be  1 percent in 
both countries.39
39 This corresponds to the average population growth rate in the US since 1970. We assume that the one-child pol-
icy in China will remain at least partially in place, implying slow population growth in line with the most recent years. 
Table 2—Calibration Summary
 < 25 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44
Age-income profile ( e j, t i )
US All periods 0.34 0.69 0.82 0.93 0.99
China 1968–88 0.80 1.00 1.17 1.19 1.27
1993 0.85 0.99 1.20 1.23 1.29
1998 0.95 1.05 1.29 1.41 1.41
2003 0.87 1.19 1.46 1.49 1.49
2008 0.79 1.34 1.64 1.59 1.58
Steady state 0.34 0.69 0.82 0.93 0.99
45–49 55–60 60–64 65–69  ≥ 70
US All periods 0.98 0.85 0.70 0.31 0.18
China 1968-88 1.32 0.77 0.17 0.11 0.09
1993 1.23 0.67 0.15 0.10 0.03
1998 1.35 0.65 0.09 0.09 0.05
2003 1.41 0.68 0.08 0.07 0.03
2008 1.48 0.71 0.06 0.03 0.01
Steady state 0.98 0.85 0.70 0.31 0.18
Pre-1968 1968–1973 1973–1978 1978–1983 1983–1988
Demographic growth ( g L, t i ), percent per year
US 1.5 6.0 2.5 0.0 −2.0
China 3.0 7.0 0.0 3.0 5.5
1988–1993 1993–1998 1998–2003 2003–2008 Post-2008
US −1.5 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.0
China −0.5 −5.0 1.5 0.0 1.0
Productivity growth ( g A, t i ), percent per year
Pre-1973 1973–2003 2003–2008 2008–2013
US 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
China 1.50 4.00 3.75 3.00
Other parameters
Share of capital ( α ) 0.28 Depreciation rate ( δ ), annual basis 0.10
e.i.s. coefficient ( σ ) 0.32 Discount factor ( β ), annual basis 0.91
Bequest motive (ϕ) 0.19 Constraint parameters ( θ US ,  θ CH ) 0.16, 0.01
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Age-Income Profiles.—The relative efficiency parameters ( e j, t i ) are calibrated to 
the wage income profile (net of taxes) across age groups, as observed in the CEX for 
the US and in the UHS data for China. In the US, coefficients are remarkably stable 
over time. We therefore set US efficiency parameters  e j, t US equal to their 2008 values 
in every period.40 Panel A of Figure 8 displays these parameters, while panel B 
depicts wage income profiles in China, at the beginning and at the end of our sam-
ple period. Compared to the US, the Chinese profile reaches its peak earlier and 
falls more steeply in old age. This feature is particularly striking in the more recent 
40 We only observe a slight flattening of the US age-income profile after age 55 in the recent period. Since this 
change is quantitatively small, our results are not affected if we take into account time variation in the US income 
profile. We set it constant in our benchmark calibration to eliminate one possible source of change in age-saving 
profiles and facilitate the interpretation of our results. 
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Figure 8. Income Profile for the US and China
Notes: Average income of a given age group divided by average income of the reference group (age 50–54). Income 
is the sum of wage and self-business income net of taxes from CEX (2008) for the US and UHS (1992 and 2008) 
for China.
Table 3—Demographic Structure in the US and China
1968 1988 2008
US China US China US China
Share of young (15–34) Data 35.1 42.6 37.9 45.8 30.7 33.4
Model 35.8 44.6 38.6 45.9 29.7 31.1
Share of middle-aged (35–54) Data 38.9 39.1 38.3 36.3 41.6 44.5
Model 36.8 35.7 36.2 35.6 40.7 44.4
Share of above 55 Data 26.0 18.3 23.8 17.9 27.7 22.1
Model 27.4 19.7 25.2 18.5 29.6 24.5
Note: Model-implied demographic structure versus data (percentage of the population between 15–74).
Source: World Population Prospects (United Nations 2011)
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period, due to a marked increase in relative wages for the 30–49 age brackets. For 
periods  t = 1, … , 4 , we set  e j, t CH to the values observed in the data for years 1993, 
1998, 2003, and 2008, respectively. Relative efficiency parameters in earlier periods 
are set to their values in 1992, our first observation year for China. Going forward, 
we assume that relative efficiency parameters in China converge to the steady-state 
level of the US after seven decades.
Credit Constraint Heterogeneity.—In the absence of direct empirical counter-
parts to the country-specific credit constraint parameters  ( θ US  ,  θ CH  ) , we use various 
measures of household credit to calibrate the relative tightness of credit constraints 
across countries. In 1998, the total amount of mortgage debt represented only 1 per-
cent of GDP in China, against 54 percent in the US, and despite some relatively 
rapid financial development in China over the subsequent decade, the difference 
remained vast in 2008 (11 percent against 87 percent).41 Looking more broadly at 
gross household debt-to-GDP, we observe for the year 2000 a ratio of 4 percent in 
China against about 67 percent in the US, a sixteen-fold difference. In 2008, the 
difference is reduced but still as large as about eight-fold (12 percent against 95 per-
cent).42 In view of these numbers, we restrict the ratio of credit constraint param-
eters  θ US  /  θ CH to be equal to 16 in our benchmark calibration. Our results remain 
unaffected as long as  θ CH is an order of magnitude smaller  θ US .43
Initial Conditions and Productivity Growth.—Initial relative productivity levels 
and subsequent productivity growth rates are set to match the output of China rel-
ative to the US over the period 1968–2008, and to allow the capital-effective-labor 
ratio in China to reach about  70 percent of that of the US in 1988, per Hall and 
Jones (1999). The resulting annual productivity growth rate for China is  4 percent 
between 1973–2003, slowing down to  3.75 percent between 2003–2008 and  3 per-
cent between 2008–2013. We assume that US productivity grows at an annual rate 
of  1.5 percent throughout, and that China grows at the same rate after 2013. Such 
differences in productivity growth across countries may seem small compared to 
observed real GDP growth differentials between the US and China ( 5 percent on 
average over 1978–2008), but a significant part of Chinese growth in our experiment 
is driven by increases in labor (increasing share of middle-aged workers, who are 
the most productive) and capital inputs, and by the increased relative efficiency of 
workers in the 25–49 age groups.
Other Calibrated Parameters.—We use  α = 0.28 for the share of labor in value 
added, corresponding to the average share of labor income in the US over the period 
1988–2008.44 The depreciation rate is set to  10 percent on an annual basis. Bequest 
transfers are assumed to be shared equally across the four age groups between 
41 Sources: Warnock and Warnock (2008), and Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. 
42 Sources: McKinsey Global Institute and Federal Reserve. Large differences in terms of financial development 
are found across other indicators as shown in Appendix B, Table B1. See also IMF (2006) documenting the relative 
growth in household credit in the US and China. 
43 In particular, our results are virtually unchanged if we set  θ US / θ CH equal to 8, corresponding to the ratio of 
gross household debt-to-GDP in the US versus China at the end of our sample period. 
44 We use OECD Quarterly National Accounts data, correcting for mixed income as in Gollin (2002). 
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25–44.45 The remaining parameters are the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
σ , the discount factor  β , the bequest motive parameter  ϕ , and the credit constraint 
parameter  θ US . These are calibrated to savings data in the integration period, while 
targeting the ratio of bequest-to-GDP in the US in that period. Specifically, let  s 0 i 
and  s j, 0 i denote the model-implied aggregate saving rate and the saving rate of agents 
of age  j in country  i in the integration period (using ten-year age brackets), and 
let  s 0 i, d and  s j, 0 i, d denote their counterparts in the data.46 Also let  b 0 US, d = 2.65 percent 
the targeted US bequest-to-GDP ratio in the data and  b 0 US the model counterpart.47 
We search over a large grid the vector of parameter values  ψ ≡  [σ, β, ϕ,  θ US ] that 
 minimizes the distance
  ∑ 
i
   |  s 0 i  (ψ )  −  s 0 i, d  | +  ∑ 
i
   ∑ 
j
    ω j i  ( s j, 0 i  (ψ )  −  s j, 0 i, d) 2 
subject to
  b 0 US  (ψ )  =  b 0 US, d  , 
where the weights  ω j i on different age groups in country  i satisfy  ∑ j     ω j i = 1 and 
reflect their shares in the total effective population.48 The optimal parameter values 
are described in Table 2. We obtain a value of 0.32 for the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution  σ , in the lower range of empirical estimates. We later perform sensi-
tivity analysis for higher values of  σ . Our estimate for  β is also in the lower range 
of conventional values. This is because our calibration aims at matching household 
savings in 1988, rather than aggregate savings, leading to a lower value for  β .
C. Results
We now present the results for our benchmark calibration. When evaluating the 
performance of the model, one should keep in mind that free parameters are calibrated 
to match savings data at the date of integration, and not using any post-1990 data.
On the aggregate level, the qualitative implications of the three-period model are 
preserved. For comparison purposes, Figure 9 displays the empirical counterpart to 
the model for household savings and current account over the period 1978–2008, 
and the five-year US interest rate over the post-integration period (1988–2008), 
 normalized to its value at time of opening.49 The model predicts a significant 
45 In PSID data, Hendricks (2001) documents that a third of bequests goes to children, another third to other 
beneficiaries (e.g., grandchildren), and the remaining third to death expenses, taxes, and charitable donations. The 
way bequests are distributed is immaterial for our results. 
46 When comparing micro data and model outcomes, we use age-saving profiles with ten-year age brackets, as 
micro data aggregated by finer age groups were unavailable for the US at the beginning of the period. 
47 We set  b 0 US, d = 2.65 percent , as documented by Gale and Scholz (1994) and De Nardi (2004) from the 
Survey of Consumer Finance for the year 1986. Hendricks (2001) finds a similar number using PSID data. 
48 Putting equal weight on different age groups does not affect our results. We adopt absolute deviations for the 
macro variables instead of squared differences, as otherwise the optimization would only weigh micro outcomes 
since micro discrepancies are on average much larger than macro ones. 
49 See Appendix B for a description of the data. We focus on the US nominal interest rate in a period of stable 
inflation (post-1988). We do not show investment rates since our calibration is targeted toward household savings 
and thus cannot match the level of aggregate savings and investment. 
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increase of the aggregate household saving rate in China ( +5.7 percentage points 
between 1988–2008) and a fall in the US (by about one percent over the same 
period), explaining about 30 percent of the savings divergence observed in the data. 
The model falls especially short of explaining the overall increase in savings in 
China. At the time of opening, China runs a small current account deficit, due to a 
growth-driven investment boom, before turning into a persistent surplus: the cur-
rent account improves by about  7 percent between 1988 and 2008. In the data, we 
observe a similar pattern: China was running small current account deficits in the 
early 1990s—as did other Asian countries, to an even greater extent—before mov-
ing into a surplus in the late 1990s. For the US, the model implies a surplus of about 
1 percent of GDP at opening, followed by a persistent deficit reaching 3 percent in 
2008. This pattern of current account imbalances arises as the standard neoclassical 
forces (capital flowing toward the capital-scarce and fast growing economy) ini-
tially dominate when China is relatively small; but as its relative size in the world 
economy rapidly increases, the world interest rate significantly drops (as in the data 
but to a lower extent), and the asymmetric saving responses across countries induce 
a reversal in current account positions.
Turning to micro-level predictions, Figure 10 juxtaposes the model-implied 
age-saving profiles in 1988 and 2008 with those estimated from the data. For the 
US, the model matches the increasing spread in the saving rates of the young 
(under 25) and middle-aged (45–54) observed in the data over two decades. Yet it 
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Note: Benchmark calibration displayed in Table 2.
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 overpredicts the fall in the young’s saving rate over this period and the saving rate of 
older  workers (55–64) in 2008. For China, the model provides a reasonably good fit 
to the relatively flat age-saving profile observed at the beginning of the period. Over 
the subsequent two decades, the model-implied saving rates for individuals between 
35–64 rise substantially (by 5 to 10 percentage points), although by less than in the 
data. The model falls especially short of explaining the increase in the savings of 
the 25–34. For individuals under 25, due to tight credit constraints in every period, 
the model predicts a roughly constant saving rate, instead of a slight increase in the 
data—in sharp contrast with the US. As a result, the model captures the increasing 
discrepancy between the saving rates of the very young and the middle-aged over 
time. At the other end of the age-saving profile however, the model is unable to 
explain the large increase in the saving rate of the elderly.50
In sum, our model can explain, with one mechanism, a significant portion of the 
rise in saving rates for most age groups in China, and the simultaneous increase 
in borrowing of the young in the US. However, it falls short of explaining the 
 overall increase in China, pointing toward mechanisms more specific to the Chinese 
economy.
50 The sharp rise in the elderly’s saving rate is most likely driven by factors outside of the model, such as a 
rising life expectancy and increasing out-of-pocket medical expenditures over the last ten years in China. De Nardi, 
French, and Jones (2010) argue these factors are key to understanding the saving rates of the old in the US. 
Figure 10. Quantitative Results: Age-Saving Profiles
Notes: Benchmark calibration displayed in Table 2. Details on the construction of empirical profiles are provided in 
Section II. Averages over the years 1986, 1992, and 1993 are used for China in 1988.
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D. Alternative Calibrations and Sensitivity Analysis
To provide further intuition on the channels driving the dynamics of savings 
across countries and age groups, we now examine the output of the model under 
alternative calibrations. In particular, we investigate the role played by the value 
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the degree of asymmetry of credit 
constraints and the shape of income profiles. We also assess the quantitative con-
tribution of changes in the Chinese income profile and of fast aging in China. For 
the sake of brevity, we display graphically only variables that exhibit significant 
changes relative to our benchmark calibration.
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution.—We first investigate the sensitivity of 
our results to the value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution  σ . Empirical 
estimates and calibrated values typically range between 0 and 1, but are usually 
slightly higher than our benchmark value (see discussion in Guvenen 2006). 
Figure  11 shows the evolution of aggregate variables for higher values of  σ , keep-
ing other parameters to their benchmark values. Higher values of  σ generate a stron-
ger divergence of saving rates across countries, amplifying the fall in US savings as 
the income effect gets weaker. In contrast, prices (interest rates) respond less over 
time and the fall of the interest rate is muted.
Asymmetry of Credit Constraints.—We next investigate the quantitative role of 
credit constraint heterogeneity—by reducing the asymmetry of the  θ ’s across coun-
tries. First, the ratio  θ US / θ CH is lowered to 8. This smaller difference in financial 
development across countries is more in line with the difference in the depth of 
household debt markets observed toward the very end of the sample period. The 
dynamics of the model (not reported here for the sake of brevity) are almost iden-
tical to those of the benchmark model. This indicates that our findings are robust to 
increasing financial development in China over the period as long as the difference 
with the US remains large throughout.
For comparison purposes, we also set the Chinese credit constraint parameter 
to the US level—shutting down any asymmetry in financial development 
( θ US / θ CH = 1). This experiment yields markedly different results (Figure 12). The 
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Figure 11. Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Notes: In the alternative experiments, the e.i.s. coefficient is set to 1/2 and 2/3. All other parameters are set to their 
benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
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aggregate saving rate falls substantially in China upon integration, while increasing 
in the US. China experiences a very large current account deficit ( −9.0 percent ) at 
the time of opening, which persists over two decades. On the micro level,  age-saving 
profiles for China are also markedly different from our benchmark calibration. In 
particular, the 1988 profile exhibits a much more pronounced inverted-U shape, 
given the massive borrowing of the young Chinese households in anticipation of 
faster growth. Simulations of the model in the absence of any credit constraints 
generate similar, counterfactual results, thus affirming the importance of both the 
presence of credit constraints and their being tighter in China for our findings.
Flat Age-Income Profiles.—We next demonstrate the importance of the shape of 
the income profile. The experiment sets relative efficiency parameters to unity at all 
ages in both countries, while keeping all other parameters at their benchmark val-
ues. As in the previous experiment, fast-growing China sees a large fall in aggregate 
savings and a massive current account deficit (Figure 13). There are two aspects of 
the shape of the calibrated age-income profiles that matter for our results. The down-
ward-sloping part of the profile gives stronger saving motives to the middle-aged, 
and at the same time limits the wealth effect of growth. The upward-sloping part of 
the profile is even more crucial as credit constraints only matter to the extent that 
younger individuals have a desire to borrow. With flat age-income profiles, credit 
constraints are not binding in any country in the steady state (despite aggregate 
productivity growth), thus bringing the model dynamics very close to a frictionless 
neoclassical representative agent model. More generally, this experiment illustrates 
the dynamics induced by a growth shock in a model where most agents have a desire 
to save in the steady state.51
Contribution of Changes in Income Profile in China.—As noted earlier, the 
age-income profile in China changed significantly over time. Toward the end of the 
sample period, the income profile reaches a higher peak at a younger age and falls 
51 However, such a model could still produce an increase in savings in a fast-growing country if the saving 
motive happens to be stronger upon fast growth, as pointed out in Carroll and Jeanne (2009). 
Figure 12. Sensitivity Analysis: Symmetric Credit Constraints
Notes: Chinese and US credit constraint parameters are set to their US value ( θ US =  θ CH = 0.16). All other param-
eters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
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more steeply in old age (see Figure 8). By providing further incentives to save for 
retirement and by reducing wealth effects for middle-aged consumers, this evolution 
contributes to the rise in Chinese savings. We assess the quantitative importance of 
this channel by keeping the relative efficiency parameters in China  ( e j, t CH ) equal to 
their initial values. All other parameters remain at their benchmark values. Figure 14 
depicts the evolution of macro variables of interest, along with the 2008 Chinese 
age-savings profile. Compared to our benchmark, aggregate savings and current 
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Figure 13. Sensitivity Analysis: Flat Age-Income Profiles
Notes: Chinese and US efficiency parameters are set to unity at all dates and all ages ( e jt i = 1 for all j). All other 
parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
Figure 14. Quantitative Results with Time-Invariant Income Profiles
Notes: In the “alternative” calibration, Chinese relative efficiency parameters are set to their 1988 value. All other 
parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
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account surplus in China rise less over the period 1988–2008, due to a smaller 
increase in the middle-aged’s saving rates over the period. As a consequence, the 
fall in interest rate is reduced.
Contribution of Fast Aging in Asia.—Since the early 1970s, China has experi-
enced an accelerated demographic transition due to fertility-restriction policies. The 
benchmark experiment takes this demographic evolution into account. To investigate 
its quantitative role, we consider an alternative experiment in which demographic 
growth in China remains at 3 percent per year until 2008 (a scenario where the 
fertility rate stays identical to its 1968 value) before converging to its  steady-state 
value of 1 percent. All other parameter values remain unchanged from the bench-
mark case. Results for the evolution of macro variables, displayed in Figure 15, are 
not very different from the benchmark simulation.52 Aggregate savings in China 
increase at a slower pace in the two decades following integration, while the interest 
rate decreases by less over that period. Indeed in the absence of a demographic tran-
sition, the share of middle-aged savers does not increase. As a result of this composi-
tion effect, the extent of the rise in savings in China (and the fall in the world interest 
rate) is smaller compared to our benchmark simulation. Higher demographic growth 
also limits the drop in interest rate by raising the marginal productivity of capi-
tal. These effects tend to dominate in the short run—but in the long run, as China 
reaches an even greater weight in the world economy, the world interest rate falls 
further, causing a larger divergence in savings.
IV. Conclusion
This paper develops a life-cycle theory of savings in large open economies with 
heterogeneous levels of household credit constraints. We show that faster growth in 
(more constrained) emerging markets can lead to a divergence in household saving 
rates across developed and emerging economies, as well as a persistent decline in the 
world interest rate. The theory provides, with a single mechanism,  micro-foundations 
52 The change in demography has little impact on age-savings profiles. 
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Figure 15. Quantitative Results with Delayed Demographic Transition in China
Notes: In the “alternative” calibration, demographic growth in China is set to its initial value of 3 percent until 2008 
and slowing down thereafter. All other parameters are set to their benchmark values displayed in Table 2.
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to the global saving glut (Bernanke 2005) and a potential answer to the “allocation 
puzzle” (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2013). The age-saving profiles estimated from US 
and China’s survey data are broadly consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, and at 
the same time lend empirical support to our theoretical predictions on the contrasted 
evolution of saving profiles between these two economies. A quantitative version 
of the model calibrated to macro and micro data for the US and China can explain 
about a third of the divergence in their aggregate household saving rates and a sub-
stantial share of the evolution of saving rates across age-groups in both countries. 
Our model, however, falls short of explaining the full extent of the “Chinese saving 
puzzle” (Modigliani and Cao 2004).
In examining micro-level evidence for China, we point out the biases that may 
arise from employing household-level data to estimate age-specific saving behav-
ior. Our endeavors to correct for these biases allow us to establish new empirical 
facts. The novel evidence we provide, along with remaining discrepancies between 
data and theory, can potentially form the basis for future research. In particular, the 
saving behavior of the old in China warrants further study. Plausible explanations 
for their puzzling behavior, not considered in this model, include the evolution of 
pension systems and health insurance or changes in life expectancy. Finally, our 
theory can be easily applied to a larger cross-section of countries, thus providing an 
additional dimension for assessing its performance in accounting for savings and 
current account patterns across countries.
Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
Consider a country  i with credit constraint parameter  θ i . Note that for  δ = 1 , we 
have  R t i = α  ( k  t i) 1−α . The law of motion for  k  t i is implicitly given by
  k  t+1 i +  β −σ   α 1−σ   ( k  t+1 i ) α(1−σ)+σ 
  =  (1 −  θ 
i  )(1 − α)   ____________________________________  
(1 +  g A, t+1 i  )(1 +  g L, t i  ) {1 +  e t+1 i  (1 +  g L, t+1 i  ) +  θ i   1 − α ___α } 
  ( k t i ) α  . 
If a steady-state level of capital  k i exists, it therefore satisfies
 k i +  β −σ   α 1−σ   ( k i ) α(1−σ)+σ 
 =  (1 −  θ 
i  )(1 − α )    ___________________________  
(1 +  g A  )(1 +  g L  ) {1 + e(1 +  g L  ) +  θ i   1 − α ___α } 
  ( k i ) α  . 
Substituting the steady-state gross rate of return  R i = α  ( k i ) 1−α , we can write
  1 +  β −σ   ( R i ) 1−σ = C ( θ i )   R i  , 
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with  C (θ) =  (1 − α ) (1 − θ)    _________________________  (1 +  g A  )(1 +  g L  ) { α [ 1 + e(1 +  g L  ) ]  + θ(1 − α ) }. Note in particular 
that  ∂ C/ ∂ θ < 0 . If  σ = 1 , the steady-state exists, is unique, and satisfies
   R i =  1 + β ______βC ( θ i )  
 = (1 +  g A  )(1 +  g L  )  1 + β ____β   
α [ 1 + e(1 +  g L  ) ]  +  θ i  (1 − α )    ___________________(1 − α ) (1 −  θ i )  . 
For  σ < 1 ,  R i is such that  v  θ i   ( R i  ) = 0 , where  v θ  (R ) ≡ 1 +  β −σ   R 1−σ − C (θ)  R 
for  R > 0 . We now show that  v θ  (R ) = 0 has a unique solution. Differentiating  v θ 
with respect to  R , we get
  
∂  v θ  ___∂ R   =   β 
−σ (1 − σ)   R −σ − C (θ) , 
which implies the following equivalence:
  
∂  v θ  ___∂ R   ≥ 0  ⇔  R ≤  
1 __β  (1 − σ)  
1 __σ  C  (θ) − 1 __σ  . 
Hence  v θ is increasing for  R ∈ ]0 ;  1 _β  (1 − σ)  1 __σ  C  (θ) − 1 __σ  ] and decreas-
ing for  R ≥  1 _β  (1 − σ)  
1 __σ  C  (θ) − 1 __σ . We also have  lim 0    v θ  (R )  = 1 > 0 
and  lim ∞    v θ  (R ) = − ∞ . Since  v θ is a continuous function, it follows that 
 v θ  (R ) = 0 has a unique solution,  R(θ ) . This is our first result. We also note in pass-
ing that our characterization of  v θ implies
(A1)  R < R(θ )  ⇔  v θ  (R )  > 0. 
We now show that countries with a higher  θ have a higher rate of return in autarky 
steady state. Consider  θ i <  θ  j and let  R i = R(  θ i  ) (resp.  R j = R(  θ  j  ) ) denote the 
well-defined solution to  v  θ i   (  R i  ) = 0 (resp.  v  θ  j   (  R j  ) = 0 ). For any  R > 0 , we can 
write
  v  θ  j   (R )  −  v  θ i   (R )  =  (C ( θ i ) − C ( θ  j ) )  R > 0, 
where the first equality follows from the definition of  v θ , and the inequality fol-
lows from  ∂ C/ ∂ θ < 0 . In particular, for  R =  R i , we have  v  θ  j   (  R i  ) −  v  θ i   (  R i  ) 
=  v  θ  j   (  R i  ) > 0 , which by remark (A1) above, is equivalent to  R i <  R j . We 
 therefore have shown that  θ i <  θ  j if and only if  R i <  R j . This establishes our 
second result,  ∂  R i / ∂  θ i > 0 , and the fact that  d  k i /d  θ i < 0 follows immediately. 
It is worthwhile to note that the theorem also holds for  σ > 1 . Our proof naturally 
extends to that case. ∎
2874 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW sEpTEMbER 2015
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
For  δ = 1 and any  σ ≤ 1 , one can easily show that the steady-state world inter-
est rate  R satisfies
(A2)  F(R )  =  ∑ 
i
     λ 
i  (1 −  θ i  )  ___________  ∑ j     λ j  (1 −  θ  j  )
 F( R i  ),  
where  F(x )  ≡ x / (1 +  β −σ   x 1−σ ) and  R i denotes the autarky steady-state interest 
rate in country  i . The bounds on  R in (14) follow from  F ′ ( ·  )  > 0 . Note that the 
 proposition also holds for  σ > 1 . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
The result follows immediately from equation (A2). ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The result follows immediately from Proposition 2 along with the observation 
that  
∂ (S/Y ) _____∂ θ < 0 and  
 ∂ 2  (S/Y ) ______∂ θ ∂ R > 0 . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
We first derive the expressions for savings by age groups given in Section IE. The 
level of saving of the young in country  i and period  t is
  S y, t i =  L  y, t i  (  w y, t i −  c y, t i  ) =  L  y, t i   a y, t+1 i = −  L  y, t i    θ 
i  ____  R t+1   w m, t+1 
i  , 
where the last equality follows from (9). Using (3) and normalizing by  Y t i 
=  [ A t i ( e t i   L y, t i +  L m, t i ) ]   k t α , we get
  
 S y,t 
i 
 ___
 Y t 
i 
 = −(1 +  g A,t+1 i )  
1 +  g L,t i   _______________  
1 +  e t i (1 +  g L,t i )
  θ i  ____ 
 R t+1 
(1 − α) (  k  t+1  ____ k  t  ) 
α
 
 = −(1 +  g A,t+1 i )  
1 +  g L,t i   _______________  
1 +  e t i (1 +  g L,t i )
 (1 − α) θ 
i 
 ________
 k  t 
α  R t+1 
  ( α ___________  R t+1 − 1 + δ) 
 α ____ 
1−α ,
where the second equality obtains by expressing  k  t+1 as a function of  R t+1 .
The level of saving of the middle-aged in country  i and period  t is
  S m, t i   =   L m, t i [ w m, t i + (  R  t − 1)  a y, t i −  c m, t i ] 
  =   L m, t i [ ( w m, t i +  R  t    a y, t i −  c m, t i ) −   a y, t i ] 
  =   L m, t i ( a m, t+1 i −   a y, t i ) 
  =   L m, t i  [ 1 −  θ i _________ 1 +  β −σ   R t+1 1−σ +   θ 
i  __ R  t  ] w m,t i ,
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where the third equality follows from (6), and the last equality follows from (9) and 
(10). Using (3) and normalizing by GDP, we get
  
 S m, t i  ____ Y t i 
   =   1 ___________ 
1 +  e t i  (1 +  g L, t i  )[ 1 −  θ 
i _________ 
1 +  β −σ   R t+1 1−σ 
+   θ i  __ R t] (1 − α ) . 
Finally, the level of saving of the old in country  i and period  t is given by
  S o, t i =  r K, t   K t i + ( R  t − 1)  [ L m, t−1 i   a m, t i −  K t i  ] −  L o, t i   c o, t i  . 
The first two terms in the expression correspond to the rental rate earned on capital 
and to interests received on other savings. Using the relationship between  r K, t and  R t , 
and substituting for  c o, t i from (7), we can write
  S o, t i = (  R  t − 1 + δ )  K t i + ( R  t − 1)  L o, t i   a m, t i − ( R  t − 1) K t i −  L o, t i   R  t   a m, t i 
 = − L o,t i  a m,t i + δ K t i 
 = − L o,t i  1 −  θ 
i ____________  
1 +  β −σ   R t 1−σ 
 w m,t−1 i + δ K t i ,
where the last equality follows from (10). The last term is dropped when net savings 
are considered. Normalizing by GDP, we then get
 
 S o, t i  ___ Y t i  
= −  1 ______ 
1 +  g A, t i 
  1 ________ 
1 +  g L, t−1 i 
  1 ____________ 
1 +  e t i  (1 +  g L, t i  )
  1 __________ 
1 +  β −σ   R t 1−σ 
 (1 −  θ i  )(1 − α )  (  k t−1  ___ k t ) 
α
  . 
Looking at savings by the young, we observe that
  ∂ _____ ∂  R t+1 (  S y, t 
i  ____ Y t i 
 ) > 0,     ∂ 2  ________ ∂  θ i  ∂  R t+1 ( 
 S y, t i  ____ Y t i 
 ) > 0. 
Looking at savings by the middle-aged, we observe that when  σ < 1 
  ∂ _____ ∂  R t+1 (  S m, t 
i  ____ Y t i 
 ) < 0,     ∂ 2  ________ ∂  θ i  ∂  R t+1 (  S m, t 
i  ____ Y t i 
 ) > 0. 
These four inequalities prove Proposition 4. ∎
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Appendix B: Data
A. Aggregate Data ( For the Figures Shown in the Introduction)
Developed Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States.
Asian Countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong SAR, China, 
India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Korea, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam.
Data on Savings, Private Savings, and Current Account (percent of GDP): Data 
for Emerging Asia and Developed Countries are from World Development Indicators 
(World Bank), Penn World Tables and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Private 
savings are computed as the difference between Aggregate saving and Primary 
Government Surplus. Data for Primary Government Surplus in Asian countries are 
only available starting in 1988 for a large sample of Asian countries.
Data on Household Saving Rates: Data for Developed Countries are from the 
OECD. For the US, the OECD series is used in Figure 1 for consistency, otherwise 
we use NIPA personal saving rate. Data for India are from the Central Bank of India. 
Data for China are from CEIC Data based on Urban Household Survey (UHS).
B. Data for the United States
Definitions
Household disposable income: sum of individual income net of taxes (in USD).
Household expenditure: household consumption expenditures (in USD).
Household saving: difference between household disposable income and con-
sumption expenditure (in USD).
Household saving rate: household saving divided by disposable income.
Consumer Expenditures Survey Data (CEX): Annual data over the period 1986–
2008 for consumption expenditures and income. Disaggregated by age groups (6 
age groups): under 25, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and above 65. Disaggregated 
by sectors of expenditures. The sectors covered in the CEX data are: Food and alco-
holic beverages, Shelter, Utilities and public services, Household expenses, Clothing 
and apparel, Vehicle purchases, Gas and motor oil, Other vehicle expenses, Public 
transportation, Health, Entertainment, Education, Tobacco, Miscellaneous and cash 
contributions, Life/personal insurance.
NIPA Data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA): Consumption and 
income data for 1986–2008. Consumption expenditures data are disaggregated by 
sectors of expenditures. We match sectors in NIPA with the corresponding sectors in 
2877coeurdacier et al.: credit constraints and GrowthVol. 105 no. 9
CEX. Only two categories in NIPA consumption expenditures (accounting for about 
1 percent of total expenditures) do not appear in CEX data (Net foreign travel and 
expenditures abroad by US residents, and Final  consumption expenditures of non-
profit institutions serving households). Aggregate consumption expenditures from 
CEX data do not match aggregate NIPA data, as a result of underreporting of con-
sumption in CEX—a bias which has increased over time. Income displays a similar 
bias but without trend.
C. Data for China
Definitions
Household disposable income: sum of individual disposable income net of taxes 
within a household.
Household consumption expenditures: sum of consumption expenditures within 
household.
Household savings: difference between household disposable income and house-
hold consumption expenditure. Rates are computed by dividing by household dis-
posable income.
Individual savings: difference between individual disposable income and indi-
vidual consumption expenditure (estimated). Rates are computed by dividing by 
individual disposable income.
Urban Household Survey Data (UHS): Annual data for the year 1986 and over 
the period 1992–2009 for consumption expenditures, income and household charac-
teristics (number of household members, age of household members, employment 
status of household members...), for a large sample of urban households in China. 
Starting from 1992, households are chosen randomly—based on several stratifications 
at the provincial, city, country, township, and neighborhood levels—and are expected 
to stay in the survey for 3 years. The 1986 survey covers 47,221 individuals in 12,185 
households across 31 provinces. The 1992–2009 surveys cover 112 prefectures across 
9 representative provinces (Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, 
Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu). The sample size has been extended over time from 
roughly 5,500 households in the 1992–2001 surveys to nearly 16,000 households in 
the 2002–2009 surveys. Disposable income is provided at the individual level for the 
years 1992–2009 and at the household level for all years.53 Data for consumption 
expenditures are given at the household level. When estimating individual consump-
tion expenditures and savings, we restrict our attention to individuals above 25 and 
income earners aged between 19–24 (annual income above 100 yuans). All individ-
uals below 18 and those under 25 who do not qualify as income earners (unless they 
are the household head’s spouse) are  considered as children, whose consumption is 
imputed to other household members (typically their parents).54
53 Information on individual income is available for 1986, but the data are very noisy and therefore not reliable. 
54 In our final specification, old dependents (i.e., individuals above 65 who do not qualify as income earners and 
living with their offspring) are treated in the same way as children, but the treatment of old dependents has little 
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Chinese Households Income Project Data (CHIP): CHIP survey data are avail-
able for the years 1995 and 2002. Income and consumption by age for these two 
years are consistent across the UHS and CHIP datasets.
D. Financial Development and Household Credit in the United States and China
Table B1, computed from various sources, exhibits large differences in financial 
development and household credit between the US and China. Data for the US are 
from Federal Reserve for Household Debt over GDP, Warnock and Warnock (2008) 
for mortgage debt over GDP. Data for China are from McKinsey Global Institute for 
Household Debt over GDP, Chinese National Bureau of Statistics for mortgage debt 
over GDP. Outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP are from GFDD 
World Bank for both countries. Data on mortgage and credit card penetration in 
2011 are from Global Financial Inclusion Database (World Bank) for both countries.
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